Last week during a press conference on Iran, Vice President Vance warned Israel about objecting to the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding. In particular, he noted that Israel and the United States do not always have the same interests, and that as Vice President, his responsibility is to the United States.
While he has received a lot of criticism for his warning, he is, of course, right on both counts. It is true that while American and Israeli interests often converge—particularly given the Trump administration’s focus on preserving Western Civilization and Israel’s instrumental role in doing so—they do not always. And indeed, when our interests diverge from Israel’s, it is for America’s leaders to decide what is right for America, and Israel’s leaders to decide what is right for Israel. This is the whole point of sovereign nation states.
What he gets wrong, then, is not the theory but the reality. Because when it comes to the appropriate end to this conflict, long-term U.S. and Israeli interests are aligned. Consternation in conservative circles about the text of the current MOU centers around the fact that it does not serve those long-term American interests. While we cannot prevent Iran from having the will to build a nuclear weapon, we can prevent it from having the capability to do so and to project power meaningfully in the region more broadly. After having successfully crippled Iran’s terrorist proxies, nuclear program, and ballistic missiles program, the United States has one hurdle left to achieve that aim: opening the Strait of Hormuz. Any outcome that recognizes Iran’s authority over the Strait—and certainly any outcome that allows the flow of billions of dollars to Iran—will empower the regime with resources to rebuild its tools of power projection, especially its nuclear program. And while much has been made of supposed IAEA monitors, the most pressing reason for the conflict in the first place was to deny Iran the ability to ever build a nuclear weapon—not, as the both the JCPOA and MOU’s text propose, merely to make sure that we can monitor the regime’s progress in doing so. In achieving such an outcome, the United States and Israel are in lockstep.
While there was some divergence in the initial aims of the war—with the United States seeking to reduce Iran’s power projection, and Israel seemingly seeking a more comprehensive regime change operation—the United States and Israel now share completely the same objective: to find an end-state that ensures the Islamic Republic remains weakened and cannot reconstitute its nuclear weapons program.
As Vice President Vance stated, it is the responsibility of the President of the United States to do what is best for the United States. When we and others criticize the MOU, it is not because it is not in the interests of Israel—it is because we believe it is not in the long-term interests of the United States.
